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Abstract  
The article addresses the tension between regulatory stability and regulatory 
change within the international regime for the protection of foreign investments. 
The work focuses on public services, a sector where striking a balance between 
stability and change has been highly problematic. In this context, modifications of 
the regulatory framework may substantially affect the profitability of investments 
that normally presuppose large network infrastructures. On the other hand, 
adapting the regulatory framework to ever-changing social needs is crucial to 
pursue fundamental social purposes. 
The article deals with this tension through the prism of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and the protection of investors’ legitimate expectations. The 
analysis shows that there has been an evolution in the arbitral practice, but that 
there is still considerable uncertainty on key aspects. The paper proposes the 
adoption of an interpretive approach that can help ease the tension between 
stability and change.     
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1. Introduction 
The international regime for the protection of foreign investments has gained 
unprecedented visibility over the past decade, due to the growth in the number of 
international investment agreements and, more importantly, the boom of investor-
State arbitration. This evolution has raised concerns about its impact on States’ 
regulatory autonomy. Indeed, the reach of these disputes goes well beyond mere 
commercial matters to encompass key aspects of host States’ socio-economic 
order. 
The regulation of public services is one of the main examples in this regard. 
Over the past few years, there have been a growing number of cases concerning 
measures taken by host States to regulate foreign investments in this sector. This 
evolution has been aided and abetted by liberalization and privatization policies 
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that, since the late 1970s, have spread all over the world. This process has opened 
up new spaces for the participation of private actors in a sector traditionally 
dominated by State-owned or State-controlled entities. However, the relationship 
between the private party and the public authority has often proved difficult, for 
both technical and socio-political reasons, often ending up before an international 
arbitral panel. 
A key concern in this context is reconciling regulatory change and regulatory 
stability. In the case of public services, the relationship between the two 
conditions is even more problematic than in other economic sectors. Indeed, 
modifications of the regulatory framework may substantially affect the 
profitability of investments that normally presuppose the existence of large 
network infrastructures and, consequently, entail high levels of sunk costs and 
long payback periods. Regulatory stability is thus a paramount concern for foreign 
investors and, according to some commentators and arbitral tribunals alike, it is a 
priority of the entire protection system. On the other hand, adapting the regulatory 
framework to ever-changing social needs and challenges is crucial for public 
services to be able serve their fundamental social purposes. The continuous 
exercise of regulatory powers now represents the main instrument at the disposal 
of national authorities to ensure that these services can contribute to fulfilling 
peoples’ everyday needs and to enhancing social cohesion. 
The outcome of this exercise depends greatly on the approach taken by 
international arbitrators to define treaty provisions and, in particular, on their 
capacity and willingness to pay due regard to the fact that these activities are not 
ordinary business operations being them functional to the pursuit of fundamental 
social objectives. Therefore, when assessing whether a change to the regulatory 
framework in which the investment operates complies with international 
protection standards, it is necessary to respect the host State’s capacity to regulate 
in the public interest. 
This article focuses on the protection of investors’ legitimate expectations 
within the fair and equitable treatment, proposing an interpretive approach that 
allow for the reconciliation of stability and change in this context. To this end, the 
article first deals with the notion of regulation in the public service sector by 
exploring its categorization as a right and/or a duty of States. The analysis then 
examines the increasingly important role played by the fair and equitable 
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treatment standard in arbitral practice, also with regard to public services’ cases. 
In particular, the article considers the difficulties of finding an equilibrium 
between stability and change in the public services’ sector by examining the 
impact of the legitimate expectations doctrine upon host States’ capacity to 
modify the regulatory framework in which the investment operates. The article 
takes a critical stance toward early arbitral award, which took a markedly pro-
investor and pro-stability approach. Lastly, building on more recent arbitral 
decisions, the article calls for the adoption of a three-steps interpretive approach 
that may contribute to ease the tension between stability and change in a highly 
sensitive sector.   
  
2. Public Services' Regulation and its Impact upon Foreign Investments: 
Change vs. Stability 
The role of the State in the provision of public services has markedly changed in 
recent decades, mainly because of the impact of the liberalization and 
privatization policies that have been variously adopted and implemented by 
several countries around the world. Some of the functions traditionally exercised 
by public authorities have been progressively transferred to private or mixed 
actors. However, public authorities are still expected to intervene in order to 
ensure that public services are organized and provided in a way that preserves 
their specific function. Indeed, these services cannot be fully equated with other 
economic activities because they are vital for fulfilling peoples’ everyday needs, 
enhancing social cohesion, and fostering economic growth. Ensuring (universal) 
access to high-quality public services is widely regarded as one of the key 
functions of the State. 
Especially in those cases where public services have been liberalized or 
privatized, regulation is the main instrument at the disposal of public authorities to 
perform this function. Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth observing 
that the notion of ‘regulation’ has an uncertain legal meaning, at least under 
international law. This paper will use the term in a broad sense encompassing all 
the measures taken by public authorities to “influenc[e], control[…] and guid[e] 
economic or other private activities with impact on others”,1 the purpose being to 
                                                        
1 M. Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services (Kluwer Law International 
2003) 4. 
4 
 
achieve specific socio-economic policy objectives.2 It should be stressed that the 
term ‘public authorities’ is meant to cover not just central authorities, but also 
independent agencies or bodies, as well as local authorities, which play a major 
role in the regulation of public services. 
A distinction is often drawn between economic and social regulation, 
depending on the objectives that it pursues.3 Economic regulation mainly aims at 
correcting market failures4 that, according to the neo-classical economic theory, 
may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, if not properly regulated. Some 
of these failures are particularly relevant to public services, as is the case of 
natural monopolies. Indeed, the supply of public services normally requires the 
existence of expensive network infrastructures that cannot be duplicated so as to 
allow the entry of new competitors. Therefore, there is the need to prevent the 
provider from exploiting its monopolistic power by, for instance, charging 
excessive fees to end-users. 
Regulation performs functions that go beyond the correction of market 
failures because it may address distortions that occur even in cases where the 
market works properly. Indeed, economic efficiency does not necessarily entail a 
fair distribution of costs and benefits. Consequently, there is a need for the State 
to intervene in order to ensure that public services can contribute to the 
achievement of fundamental social objectives. 5  This may occur through the 
imposition of public service obligations upon the provider or the providers. These 
obligations, which may take different forms and have different purposes, are 
generally geared to ensuring the affordability, geographical coverage and quality 
of public services’ supply.6 
                                                        
2 The Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R.S. Khemani and 
D.M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs (OECD 
1993) defines regulation as the ‘imposition of rules by government, backed by the use of penalties that 
are intended specifically to modify the economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private 
sector”. An equally broad definition is used by B.M. Mittnick, The Political Economy of Regulation 
(Columbia University Press 1980) 1. The Author defines regulation as ‘the intentional restriction of a 
subject’s choice of activity by an entity not directly party or involved in that activity’. 
3 This distinction is not to be taken too rigidly, as regulatory measures normally pursue different types 
of objectives simultaneously. See Krajewski (n. 1) 18. 
4 R. Baldwin, M. Cave, Understanding Regulation – Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford University Press 
1999) ch. 2. Conversely, according to the private interest theories of regulation, regulatory functions 
are not meant to serve the public interest because they are captured by powerful private groups. See 
E. Dal Bò, ‘Regulatory Capture: A Review’ (2006) 22 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 203, 203-225. 
5 G. Palast, J. Oppenheimer and T. Macgregor, Democracy and Regulation: How the Public Can 
Govern Essential Services (Pluto Press 2003). 
6  I. Houben, ‘Public Services Obligations: Moral Counterbalance of Technical Liberalization 
Legislation’ (2008) 16 European Review of Private Law 7, 7-27. 
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Public services are by no means the only economic sector where States 
exercise their regulatory functions. However, in this context, regulation plays a 
role that is far more important than in other economic sectors because it has a 
‘constitutive’ value. Indeed, the exercise of regulatory functions by public 
authorities, through the imposition of specific obligations on the supply of the 
service, marks the existence of a ‘public service’ and distinguishes it, also with 
regard to its legal status, from other economic activities. This is what is called the 
‘objective’ approach to the definition of ‘public service’, so as to distinguish it 
from the traditional ‘subjective’ understanding of the notion. The latter derives 
from the French doctrine of service public and tends to identify public services by 
looking at the subject providing them, which is the State or a State-controlled 
entity. 7  The objective definition of public services has gained increasing 
recognition in recent times because it better reflects the evolution of the role of 
the State in the provision of public services. For instance, this definition is 
commonly used in the EU legal order to define the notion of ‘services of general 
economic interest’, an expression which is used in that context to avoid the 
ambiguities deriving from the use of ‘public services’.8 In 2003, the European 
Commission explained that the concept, which can be found in Article 106.2 
TFEU, refers to “services of an economic nature which the Member States or the 
Community subject to specific public service obligations by virtue of a general 
interest criterion”.9 
As observed by Lowe with regard to regulation in general, the exercise of 
regulatory functions is “an essential element of the permanent sovereignty of each 
State over its economy”10 and it must consequently be considered as a sovereign 
right. The existence of such a right has been recalled by the GATS, whose 
Preamble reiterates the need to respect “the right of members to regulate, and to 
introduce new regulation, on the supply of services within their territories in order 
                                                        
7 See M. Hariou, Précis de droit administratif et de droit public (Sirey 1927); G. Jèze, ‘Le service public’ 
(1926) Revista de Drept Public 167, 171-172. 
8 But these efforts seem to have been to little avail because the notion of services of general economic 
interest, as well as its relationship with other related concepts, such as that of services of general 
interest, is still uncertain and has generated much confusion. See generally U. Neergaard, ‘Services of 
General Economic Interest: The Nature of the Beast’, in M. Krajewski, U. Neergaard and J. Van de 
Gronden (eds), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe (TMC Asser Press 
2009) 17-50. 
9 European Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest (2013) COM(2003) 270 def., 17. 
10 V. Lowe, ‘Regulation or Expropriation?’, (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 447, 450-451. 
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to meet national policy objectives”.11  The need to preserve States’ regulatory 
autonomy seems to have finally made its way also into international investment 
agreements, being couched in terms that strongly recall those used in the GATS.12 
For instance, in Article 8.9, paragraph 1, of the Investment Chapter of the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) the Parties 
“reaffirm their right to regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy 
objectives”.13    
Preserving host State’s capacity fully to exercise its regulatory powers is all 
the more important with regard to public services, as their provision represents 
one of State’s core sovereign functions and, ultimately, its very raison d’être. The 
role of public services as constitutive elements of the State had already been 
emphasised in the early nineteenth century by the so-called School of Bordeaux. 
In particular Leon Duguit, the founder of the School, criticized the assimilation of 
the State to the concept of puissance public, 14  instead conceiving it as a 
“cooperation de services publics organisés et controlés par des gouvernants”.15 
This approach still retains its value because public services continue to be “a key 
element of the modern social and welfare state”16 and a building block of its 
legitimacy.   
The adoption of a less State-centric vision has opened up new perspectives on 
the regulation of public services, which is now increasingly considered as a duty 
                                                        
11 The recognition of this right sought to respond to the concerns that the adoption of GATS might 
jeopardize States’ capacity to regulate services and, in particular, public services. The WTO website 
also features a section devoted to “Misunderstanding and scare stories: The right to regulate” 
(<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction11_e.htm> accessed on 27 October 
2016). On the relationship between trade and public services see A. Arena, ‘The GATS Notion of 
Public Services as an Instance of Intergovernmental Agnosticism: Comparative Insights from the EU 
Supranational Dialectics’, (2011) 45 Journal of World Trade 489, 489-528; M. Krajewski, ‘Public Services 
and Trade Liberalization: Mapping the Legal Framework’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law 
341, 341-367; R. Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’ (2005) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 
455, 455-485. 
12 This is just another example of the tendency by international investment agreements to borrow 
from the WTO system, in the attempt to rebalance economic and non-economic concerns within the 
international regime for the protection of foreign investments. On this trend see generally J. Kurtz, 
The WTO and International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
13 The Agreement has been signed on 30 October 2016 after that negotiations were concluded in 
August 2014. A consolidated version of the Agreement can be accessed here: 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf> accessed on 31 
October 2016. 
14 See M. Hariou, Precis de droit administratif et droit public (Larose 1901) 26-27. 
15  L. Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionel. Tome cinquiéme. Les libertés publiques (Ancienne 
Librairie Fontemoing 1925) 55. 
16  M. Krajewski, ‘Investment Law and Public Services’, 3 available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038514>  accessed on 27 October 2016). 
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of the State and not just a sovereign right.17 This evolution has mainly taken place 
with regard to the objective of ensuring the full protection of human rights, and, in 
particular, social and economic rights. It is worth observing, due to its importance 
for this inquiry, that the debate has mostly centred on States’ responsibilities in 
those cases where the supply of essential services has been entrusted to private 
operators.18 There is now consensus on the fact that the choice of outsourcing 
public services’ provision to private actors does not absolve the State from the 
realization of rights and, hence, from making use of all the regulatory tools at its 
disposal to this end. For instance, in 2007 the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, after recalling that international human rights law is neutral with respect to 
the operational arrangement adopted for the provision of services, confirmed that 
“Governments and public officials remain primarily responsible for ensuring 
progress toward the realization of rights” and, consequently, they “must take 
measures to ensure that limited resources, public as well as private, are used in the 
most effective manner to promote the realization of rights, giving particular 
attention to improving the situation of those most in need”.19 This argument has 
been reiterated and better specified with particular regard to the right to water and 
sanitation. The Human Rights Council, in a Resolution adopted in 2010, 
reaffirmed that “the delegation of the delivery of safe drinking water and/or 
sanitation services to a third party does not exempt the State from its human rights 
obligations” and called upon States to adopt a detailed series of measures to fulfil 
their duties. Inter alia, States are urged to develop appropriate tools and 
mechanisms “to achieve progressively the full realization of human rights 
obligations related to safe drinking water and sanitation, including in currently 
unserved and underserved areas” and “to adopt and implement effective 
regulatory frameworks for all service providers in line with the human rights 
                                                        
17 See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Handbook for National 
Human Rights Institutions (United Nations 2005), 18 where it states that “[t]he obligation to fulfil 
economic, social and cultural rights … can entail issues such as … the provision of basic public 
services and infrastructures”. 
18 C. Graham, ‘Human Rights and the Privatization of Public Utilities and Essential Services’, in K. 
De Feyter and F. Gómez Isa (eds), Privatization and Human Rights in the Age of Globalization (Intersentia 
2005) 33-56. 
19 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to ECOSOC (focusing on the 
concept of progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights), UN Doc. E/2007/82 of 25 
June 2007, parr. 34-36. 
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obligations of States”.20 
The exercise of regulatory functions by the host States with regard to public 
services has a profound impact on the investments made in this sector. The 
viability and the profitability of the activity carried out by the investor is heavily 
dependent on the regulatory choices adopted by the competent authorities with 
regard, for instance, to the obligations to be fulfilled in supplying the service or 
the mechanism for the calculation of tariffs. This dependence is made more acute 
by the fact that these investments normally presuppose the existence of large 
network infrastructures and, consequently, entail high levels of sunk costs and 
long payback periods. On the one hand, investors are 'hostage' to the host State 
because assets cannot be moved elsewhere. On the other hand, infrastructure 
investments are particularly exposed to the so-called obsolescing bargain 
phenomenon,21 which may occur after the bulk of the investment has been made 
and the host government, mostly for political or just electoral reasons, seeks to 
force a revision of the terms of the agreement with the investor by resorting to its 
sovereign powers. This is what happened in the Vivendi II case, where the newly-
elected authorities of the Province of Tucumán did everything in their power to 
undermine the privatization of water and sewage services which had been enacted 
by the earlier administration. To this end, they mounted what the arbitral tribunal 
defined “an illegitimate campaign against the concession” 22  by using their 
regulatory powers to put pressure on the concessionaire. 
 
3. Regulatory Change vs. Regulatory Stability in the Context of Public 
Services through the Lens of the Fair and Equitable Treatment: Taking 
Stock  
 
3.1 Stability and Protection of Legitimate Expectations as Elements of the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Standard: Issues of Why and How   
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard has acquired an increasingly 
                                                        
20 Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council. Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation (2010) A/HRC/RES/15/9.   
21 See R. Vernon, ‘Long-Run Trends in Concession Contracts’ (1967) Proceedings of the American Society 
for International Law 81, 81-89. See more recently E.J. Woodhouse, ‘The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? 
Foreign Investment in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries’ (2006) 38 New York Journal 
of International Law and Policy 121, 121-219. 
22 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquijia S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (20 August 2007) para. 7.4.19. 
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important role in the debate on the balance between host States’ regulatory 
flexibility and foreign investors’ need for regulatory stability under international 
investment law. It has progressively taken precedence over the discipline of 
expropriation. The standard was long “a sleeping beauty”23 in the international 
regime for the protection of foreign investors because arbitral tribunals 
‘discovered’ it only in the 2000s. However, in a few years it has become the most 
frequently invoked standard in investment disputes24 or, as pretentiously stated in 
AWG/Suez, “the Grundnorm or basic norm of international investment law”.25 
There are two main reasons for its success. First, the FET is less politically 
charged than other standards as “it provides a more supple way of providing a 
remedy appropriate to the particular situation as compared to the more drastic 
determination and remedy inherent in the concept of regulatory expropriation”.26 
Second, much emphasis has been put on the alleged intrinsic vagueness27 of an 
“amorphous concept”, 28  allowing international arbitrators to progressively 
broadening the scope of application of the standard to foreign investors’ 
advantage. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that the use of an 
“intentionally vague term” was specifically meant to “give adjudicators a quasi-
legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the 
treaty’s object and purpose”.29 This overstatement of the role and functions of 
arbitral tribunals clearly evidences the mindset that allowed FET to become a sort 
of “catch all provision which may embrace a very broad number of governmental 
acts”,30 having a potentially considerable impact on the freedom of a government 
                                                        
23 C. Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law’, in F. Ortino, L. Liberti, A. 
Sheppard and H. Warner (eds), Investment Treaty Law. Current Issues II (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law 2007), 92. 
24 R. Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’ (2005) 39 The 
International Lawyer, 87, 87. 
25 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi International S.S. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, 
UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Jurisdiction (3 August 2006), para. 188. 
26 International Thunderbird Gaming v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award 
(26 January 2006), Separate Opinion of Prof. T. Wälde. See also Sempra Energy International v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (28 September 2007) para. 301. 
27 S. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule 
of Law’, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6, 5. 
28 B. Choudhury, ‘Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in International 
Investment Law’ (2005) 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 297, 297. 
29 C. Brower II, ‘Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 37, 66. 
30 Dolzer (n. 24) 88. 
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to regulate its economy.31 
Over the years, arbitral tribunals have identified a number of elements that 
give substance to the standard. One of the components is host States’ obligation to 
respect and protect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations with respect to the 
investment that they have made. This aspect has rapidly gained a prominent role 
in the definition of FET, becoming one of its key ingredients or, even, “the 
dominant element of that standard”.32 The increasingly important role played by 
this element in defining the content of FET is highly relevant for our analysis. 
Indeed, as aptly observed in a UNCTAD report on FET, “[t]he concept of 
legitimate expectations is connected to the phenomenon of ‘change’”33 and, in 
particular, to the possibility for national authorities to exercise their regulatory 
power in a way that modifies, even substantially, the legal environment in which 
the investment was decided and made. 
The success of the legitimate expectation doctrine rests on a considerable 
amount of uncertainty as to the legal basis for the inclusion of this duty in the FET 
standard, as well as to the identification of the theoretical justification for such an 
inclusion. Indeed, lack of rigour in the analysis on the roots of the notion often 
goes hands in hands with the absence of a clear definition of the function that this 
element is to perform in the context of FET and, more broadly, within the 
international regime for the protection of foreign investments. 
The obligation to protect investors’ legitimate expectations does not find any 
explicit normative anchoring, because no investment treaty refers to it when 
defining the FET.34 Arbitral tribunals have relied on a disparate set of grounds 
without paying much attention to their solidity. Some of them have referred to the 
good faith principle, as it would allegedly requires “the Contracting Parties to 
provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the 
                                                        
31 Lowe (n. 10) 455. 
32 Saluka v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (17 March 2006) para. 301. 
33  UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment. A Sequel, Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II (UN Publication 2012), 63. See also M. Hirsch, ‘Between Fair and Equitable Treatment 
and Stabilization Clause: Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International 
Investment Law’ (2011) 12 Journal of World Investment and Trade 783, 786. 
34 M. Potestà, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the 
Limits of a Controversial Concept’ (2013) 28 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 88, 90. 
11 
 
investment”.35 However, this approach has been rightly criticized on the grounds 
that the reference to the principle of good faith “does not suffice to explain why a 
treaty standard such as fair and equitable treatment should be read as 
encompassing the particular sub-element of the duty to protect legitimate 
expectations”.36 Equally unconvincing appears to be the choice made by other 
tribunals to rely on a selectively purposive reading of the notion of FET, 
observing that the preamble of some BITs recognizes “that the fair and equitable 
treatment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investments”.37 
This approach, although apparently in line with the one codified by the 1969 
Vienna Convention, tends to disregard the sequence provided for therein, by 
jumping directly to the second step, which concerns the purpose of the Treaty, and 
not first giving words their literal meaning. Additionally, often arbitrators decided 
to focus on just one of the many resounding objectives normally contained in 
investment treaties’ preambles, without providing any valid reason for this 
selective approach. Lastly, many arbitral tribunals have not even tried to find a 
solid legal ground for the inclusion of obligations to protect foreign investors’ 
expectations within the FET, since they have simply pointed to the existence of 
“an overwhelming jurisdictional trend” going in that direction.38 This approach 
has been rightly criticized since, as rightly observed by Michele Potestà, “[r]esort 
to ‘precedent’ should be no substitute for analysis – especially if such an analysis 
is not to be found in early awards on which subsequent tribunals rely”.39 
In the attempt to provide a more solid justification as to whether host States 
are bound to respect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations, a number of 
scholars posited that the protection of legitimate expectations can be considered as 
a general principle of law. This conclusion rests on the use of a comparative 
analysis that leads these authors to observe that the notion at stake is “rooted in 
                                                        
35  Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
Award (29 May 2003) para. 154. 
36  Potestà (n. 34) 92. See also T. Gazzini, ‘General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign 
Investment’ (2009) 10 Journal of World Investment and Trade 103, 117. 
37 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final 
Award (12 May 2005). 
38 El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award 
(31 October 2011) para. 355. See also AWG/Suez (n. 25) para. 222. In the latter case, the Tribunal 
simply observed that “[i]n an effort to develop an operational method for determining the existence 
or non-existence of fair and equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals have increasingly taken into account 
the legitimate expectations that a host country has created in the investor and the extent to which 
conduct by the host government subsequent to the investment has frustrated those expectations”. 
39 Potestà (n. 34) 91. See also A. Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: 
The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 179, 179. 
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principles of domestic administrative law that are common to a number of 
different legal systems”.40 From this point of view, the protection of legitimate 
expectations is not just an element of a treaty standard – the FET – but a self-
standing obligation or, to put it differently, an example of those “treaty-
overarching rules of international investment rules” that arbitral decisions can 
create when they “function as a mechanism of global governance”.41 Although far 
more refined than those seen above, this approach is controversial, especially 
from a methodological perspective. Indeed, the comparative analysis employed to 
determine whether the protection of legitimate expectations is a general principle 
of law has often been thin and selective. On the one side, the analysis tended to 
gloss over, or even disregard, the often-profound differences that characterize the 
enforcement in different national systems of principles, as it is the case with 
regard to legitimate expectations, that are common just by name.42 On the other 
side, it has been convincingly demonstrated the tendency by the proponents of this 
approach to take into consideration just selected legal systems, focusing on 
developed States while largely excluding those from the developing World.43  
This article takes the view that there is no need to look beyond the language 
and purpose of FET treaty provisions to find a sufficiently solid legal ground for 
considering the respect of foreign investors’ legitimate expectations as a 
constitutive element of the standard at stake. In this regard, it is difficult to agree 
with Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, who argued that “the assertion that fair and 
equitable treatment includes an obligation to satisfy or not to frustrate the 
legitimate expectations of the investor … does not correspond, in any language, to 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms ‘fair and equitable’”.44  
Furthermore, treaty provisions, interpreted in accordance with the rules 
codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention, are the first element that arbitral 
tribunals – acting as international law adjudicators – have to consider when 
                                                        
40  Potestà (n. 34) 89. See generally E. Snodgrass, ‘Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations. 
Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle’ (2006) 21 ICSID Review 1, 1-58. 
41 S. Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law – An Introduction’, in S. 
Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 19.   
42 As admitted even by some of the proponents of this approach, see Potestà (n. 34) 97-98. 
43 J. Kurtz, ‘The Shifting Landscape of International Investment Law and Its Commentary’ (2012) 106 
American Journal of International Law 686, 693. 
44 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi International S.S. v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, 
UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Liability (30 July 2010) Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro 
Nikken, para. 3. 
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defining the limits of the protection afforded to legitimate expectations in the 
context of FET or, in other words, the function that this element should play 
therein. The emphasis put on the vagueness of FET provisions, which has been 
largely instrumental to justify unduly broad interpretation of the standard, is a bit 
overdue. A growing number of investment agreements contain textual elements 
that are relevant to define the level of protection afforded to stability and 
legitimate expectations within the FET.45 For instance, Article 10 of the Energy 
Charter Treaty put much emphasis on stability and it draws an explicit link 
between this element and FET, establishing that Contracting Parties have to 
“encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for 
Investors of other Contracting Parties”, by according them at all times fair and 
equitable treatment. Conversely, Article 8.2, paragraph 2, CETA, specifies that 
“for greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a 
modification to its laws, in a manner which negatively affects an investment or 
interferes with an investor’s expectations, including its expectations of profits, 
does not amount to a breach of an obligation under this Section”. These two 
examples demonstrates that arbitral tribunals cannot flesh out the substantive 
content of the obligation to protect legitimate expectations once and for all, by 
simply referring to allegedly overarching principles, but they need to first engage 
with the language of applicable treaty provisions.  
Moreover, arbitral tribunals have to interpret FET provisions in the light of 
the treaty’s purposes, avoiding considering some of them as the dominant ones, in 
order to maximise the protection of foreign investment at the expenses of 
competing interests and values. More recent arbitral decisions offers a more 
balanced reading of treaties’ preambles, giving adequate consideration also to 
those objectives, such as safeguarding host States’ capacity to modify the 
regulatory framework, that are potentially at odds with regulatory stability.46  
Should the interpretive methods codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention fail 
to offer a clear answer, arbitral tribunals could turn to the experience of other 
                                                        
45  This is one of the main aspects taken into consideration by States seeking to better define 
investment agreements’ substantive standards, in order to reduce the possibility of successful 
challenges against their regulatory measures. See C. Henckels, ‘Protecting Regulatory Autonomy 
Through Greater Precision in Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA and TTIP’ (2016) 19 Journal of 
International Economic Law 27, 27-50.   
46  Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (5 
September 2008) para. 458 
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legal systems that have already dealt with these issues. However, the comparative 
inquiry is to be carried out with extreme caution, so to avoid engaging in blind 
transplants of solutions that do not suit the structure and function of international 
investment arbitration. The first element that calls for careful evaluation is the 
selection of comparators. On this issue, this article by and large share the 
perspective recently taken by Henckels, according to whom international arbitral 
tribunals should take into consideration the decisions of other international bodies 
charged with “the adjudication of domestic regulatory and administrative 
measures for compliance with a government’s treaty obligation”,47 and not those 
of national courts.48 Even though international arbitral tribunals are called upon to 
adjudicate challenges brought against national administrative and regulatory 
choices, they cannot be analogized to national courts, since they are not embedded 
in a national polity and they lack the institutional checks that normally exist 
within domestic public law regimes.49 The adoption of such perspective reduces 
the number of possible comparators to just a few. With specific regard to the 
notion of legitimate expectations, there seems to be two comparators that stands 
out in this regard: the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, the call for caution issued above 
and aimed at preventing the risk of crude transplants of solution elaborated 
elsewhere, also applies with regard these two courts. Indeed, international 
arbitrators needs to pay due consideration to the differences that may exist 
between expectations that may arise in the context of an economic operation and 
those protected under a human rights treaty. This is even more the case when 
taking into consideration how this notion is defined and applied by a court, such 
as the CJEU, which operate in a system that has unique institutional features and 
pursues goals that are alien to the international regime for the protection of 
foreign investments. And yet, relying upon the experience of both these courts can 
help international arbitral tribunals to work out a more principled approach when 
it comes to identifying the limits of the protection of legitimate expectations and, 
thus, finding a balance between regulatory stability and change in the context of 
                                                        
47 C. Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration. Balancing Investment 
Protection and Regulatory Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2015) 12-16. 
48 Contra Schill (n. 41) 16. 
49  Kurtz (n. 43) 693. See, more generally, J. Alvarez, ‘Beware: Boundary Crossing – A Critical 
Appraisal to Public Law Approaches to International Investment Law’, 17 Journal of World Investment & 
Trade 171, 171-228.  
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FET.  
 
3.2 Regulatory Stability at Any Cost: The Early Argentine Cases 
The need to find a workable balance between stability and change is all the 
more urgent in the field of public services. As seen above, regulatory changes 
may substantially affect the economic profitability of projects that normally 
presuppose the existence of large network infrastructures and, consequently, entail 
high levels of sunk costs and payback periods, while assets cannot be moved 
elsewhere. On the other hand, there is the need to ensure an adequate regulatory 
space to national authorities so that they may continuously exercise their 
sovereign function by adapting the regulatory framework to ever-changing needs 
and challenges.  
The case of Argentina provides a vivid illustration of the problems that tarnish 
the relationship between the protection of foreign investors’ legitimate 
expectations and the safeguarding of host States’ regulatory autonomy in the field 
of public services. As is well known, in the early 2000s, the growth of public debt 
drove Argentina into recession, causing massive protests and social unrest 
because most of the country’s households were no longer able to cope with 
everyday life expenses. In order to guarantee access to basic public services, such 
as water, sewage, electricity and gas, the Government first forced private 
investors to accept a temporary freezing of tariffs and, subsequently, adopted the 
Ley de Emergencia, establishing that tariffs and prices for public services were to 
be calculated in pesos, abolishing all clauses calling for tariff adjustments in US 
dollars or other foreign currencies, eliminating all indexing mechanisms, and 
directing the executive branch to renegotiate all public service contracts. Many 
foreign investors resorted to international arbitration, 50  claiming that these 
measures violated several provisions of the bilateral treaties concluded by 
Argentina with their home countries. In particular, claimants contended that 
Argentina had failed to treat them fairly and equitably, arguing that the challenged 
measures represented a substantial modification of the legal framework devised in 
the early 1990s to support the public utilities’ privatization programmes and were, 
thus, a violation of the expectations created by the guarantees on which private 
                                                        
50 See generally W.W. Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the 
Legitimacy of the ICSID System’, in M. Waibel (ed.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: 
Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International 2010) 407-432. 
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investors had relied when deciding to invest. 
Unsurprisingly, the need to strike a balance between these competing interests 
was recognized, at least on paper, in all cases concerning public services. Each 
arbitral decision acknowledged that the duty to ensure the stability and 
predictability of the regulatory framework does not entail the immutability of the 
legal order. Or, as said in CMS, “[i]t is not a question whether the legal 
framework might need to be frozen as it can always evolve and be adapted to 
changing circumstances, but neither is it a question of whether the framework can 
be dispensed with altogether when specific commitments to the contrary have 
been made”.51 This dictum progressively acquired an iconic status, being quoted 
in all subsequent decisions dealing with the matter. However, in many cases it 
turned out to be an empty formula, or, as aptly observed in El Paso, “a general 
statement of principle with no legal consequences on the settlement of the case”.52 
Although rather harsh in its tone, the latter remark reflects the criticisms 
levelled against an early line of decisions that adopted a markedly pro-investor 
stance, paying little attention to the host State’s capacity to adapt the legal 
framework governing the provision of public services to a deteriorating economic 
situation. In particular, early arbitral decisions concerning the emergency 
measures adopted by Argentina, such as CMS, LG&E, Sempra and Enron, were 
swift to side with claimants because they adopted a far-reaching understanding of 
host States’ duty to ensure the stability of the environment in which foreign 
investments operate. 
In CMS, the arbitral tribunal held that Argentina’s measures resulted in a 
breach of the FET standard because they “in fact entirely transform and alter the 
legal and business environment under which the investment was decided and 
made”.53 This conclusion rests on a purposive reading of the notion of FET, since 
the tribunal noted that the Preamble of the applicable BIT recognizes the close 
link between this standard and the maintenance of “a stable framework for 
investments and maximum effective use of resources”. Therefore, “there can be 
no doubt” that ensuring the stability of the legal and business framework is “an 
essential element” of the standard. Subsequent decisions adopted the same line of 
reasoning, as they considered it “an emerging standard of fair and equitable 
                                                        
51 CMS (n. 37) para. 277. 
52 El Paso (n. 38) para. 371. 
53 CMS (n. 37) para. 275. 
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treatment in international law”. 54  The LG&E decision stands for the same 
proposition, while further adding that “the fair and equitable standard consists of 
the host State’s consistent and transparent behaviour, free of ambiguity that 
involves the obligation to grant and maintain a stable and predictable legal 
framework necessary to fulfil the justified expectations of the foreign investor”.55 
Likewise, in Enron, the Tribunal found “an objective breach” of FET, since “the 
guarantees of the tariff regime that had seduced so many foreign investors were 
dismantled” and “the stable legal framework that induced the investment is no 
longer in place”.56 
The focus of these decisions was firmly on investors’ position and on their 
expectations, while giving little consideration to the position of the host State and 
its right to regulate.57 Such a bias clearly emerges from the selective reference to 
the Preamble of the BIT made by the CMS and LG&E decisions. In both cases, 
tribunals only retained the first prong of the provision, since it was functional to 
demonstrating that stability is a constitutive element of FET, while dropping the 
second one, which would have called for greater consideration of State’s capacity 
to guarantee to its population maximum effective use of its resources. This article 
argues that such a one-sided approach is ill-suited to defining the content of a 
standard “entailing reasonableness and proportionality”.58   
  
4. Reconciling Regulatory Change and Regulatory Stability in the 
Context of Public Services: The Way Forward 
4.1 Not Any Expectation is Legitimate: The Need for Specific Commitments 
Subsequent decisions tried to distance themselves from this over-expansive, 
                                                        
54  LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. And LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006) para. 125. 
55  Ibid., para. 125. This conclusion echoes the very demanding, and much criticized, standard 
developed in Tecmed (para. 154). Douglas observed that “[t]he Tecmed ‘standard’ is not a standard at 
all; it is rather a description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to which all States should 
aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain”. See Z. Douglas, ‘Nothing if not Critical for Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’ (2006) 22 Arbitration International 27, 28. 
56  Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007) paras 266-268. 
57 This approach seems to reflect what Crema convincingly described as the international investment 
regime’s cultural bias against domestic regulation. Indeed, in this framework “excessive domestic 
regulation, discriminatory or not, unfair or not, is in any case problematic: it is a local, particularistic 
obstacle to the bigger game of reallocating resources in a better way for the good of a greater number 
of persons”. See L. Crema, ‘Investors’ Rights and Well-Being. Remarks on the Interpretation of 
Investment Treaties in Light of Other Rights’, in T. Treves, F. Seatzu and S. Trevisanut (eds), Foreign 
Investment, International Law and Common Concerns (Routledge 2014) 60-61. 
58 El Paso (n. 38) para. 373. 
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and excessively pro-investor, reading of the FET standard by tentatively devising 
a more principled operational test to better define the boundaries of the protection 
offered by the standard at stake. These arbitral tribunals sought to make it clear 
that not all expectations of the investor fall within the scope of the FET, but only 
legitimate ones. Consequently, they sought to identify a number of qualifying 
requirements to determine whether an expectation may be deemed ‘legitimate’ 
and therefore subject to protection under the FET standard.  One of the most 
delicate issues in this regard is the identification of the sources from which 
legitimate expectations may arise. 
The key question is whether private investors can claim to have enforceable 
expectations simply by relying on legislative or regulatory instruments of a 
general character, or whether they have to show the existence of more specific 
promises by the host State.59 The answer is decisive in striking a balance between 
regulatory stability and change because it determines the scope of the host State’s 
duty to maintain ‘a stable legal environment’. Indeed, if investors can claim to 
have legitimate expectations simply by relying on the general legislative and 
regulatory framework in force when they made the investment, any modification 
of that framework may entail a violation of FET. This would transform the 
standard into a sort of general stabilization clause,60 fettering States’ capacity to 
regulate their economy and going “beyond what the investor could legitimately 
expect”.61 
It is worth observing that, by adopting this approach, international arbitral 
tribunals end up by ensuring private investors a higher level of protection than 
even national judges ensure. Indeed, the latter have traditionally been extremely 
cautious in this regard, as “only exceptionally has the concept of legitimate 
expectations been the basis of redress when legislative action by a State was at 
stake”.62 As observed by Steele with regard to the English legal system, “it seems 
likely that protecting an expectation in a ‘change of policy’ scenario will have 
                                                        
59 See generally Hirsch (n. 33) 787-797. 
60 See recently P. Bertoli, Z. Crespi Reghizzi, ‘Regulatory Measures, Standards of Treatment and the 
Law Applicable to Investment Disputes’, in Treves, Seatzu and Trevisanut (eds) (n. 57) 36. 
61 C. Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (2005) 11 Journal of World Investment 
and Trade 357, 374. Contra A. Boute, ‘Challenging the Re-Regulation of Liberalized Electricity Prices 
under Investment Arbitration’ (2011) 32 Energy Law Journal 523, 523-626. 
62 Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability (27 
December 2010) para. 129. 
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more wide-ranging implications for decisions-maker’s freedom of action”.63 This 
proposition finds strong support in the case law of the CJEU, which has 
constantly held that “traders cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing 
situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the 
exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained”.64 The reason for a such 
a restrictive approach is avoiding the risk of regulatory freezing. Indeed, as 
explained by the CJEU in Brasserie du Pêcheur, “even where the legality of 
measures is subject to judicial review, exercise of the legislative function must not 
be hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever the general interest 
of the Community requires legislative measures to be adopted which may 
adversely affect individual interests”.65  
Conversely, early public service decisions took a different path. In LG&E, for 
instance, the Tribunal established that Argentina acted unfairly and inequitably by 
frustrating the claimant’s reliance upon “certain key guarantees in the Gas Law 
and implementing regulation”.66 Likewise, in Enron, the Arbitral Tribunal found 
that the dismantling of the tariff regime amounted to a violation of the FET 
standard, as “it was in reliance upon the conditions established by the Respondent 
in the regulatory framework for the gas sector that Enron embarked on its 
investment in TGS. Given the scope of Argentina’s privatization process, its 
international marketing, and the statutory enshrinement of the tariff regime, Enron 
had reasonable grounds to rely on such conditions”. 67  Despite some passing 
reference to the need for “specific commitments”, these dicta convey the idea that 
guarantees that can be inferred from domestic legislative and regulatory acts of 
general application may be sufficient to create legitimate expectations. According 
to this line of cases, the decisive element in assessing the legitimacy of the 
expectations is not the origin or the nature of the guarantees, but the fact that 
investors relied upon them when deciding to invest. 
                                                        
63 I. Steele, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations: Striking the Right Balance’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly 
Review 300, 303. 
64 Case 245/81, Edeka Zentrale AG v Germany [1982], ECR 2745, para. 27; Case 52/81, Offene 
Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Werner Faust v Commission, [1982], ECR 3745, para. 27; Joined Cases 
424-425/85, Cooeperative Melkproducentenbedrijven Noord-Nederland BA (Frico) and Others v 
Voedselvoorzienings In - en Verkoopbureau [1987], ECR 2755, para. 33. See generally P. Craig, EU 
Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 635-639; T. Tridimas, General Principles of EU 
Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 273-280. 
65 Case C-46/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996], ECR 1029, para. 45. 
66 LG&E (n. 54) para. 133. 
67 Enron (n. 56) para. 265. 
20 
 
Subsequent arbitral decisions tried to devise a less investor-centred approach 
to the issue. In Continental Casualty, a case concerning Argentina’s insurance 
market, the Tribunal sought to shed more light on the link between the source of 
the expectations and their legitimacy. For this purpose, it distinguished between 
different types of expectations by pointing out that general legislative statements 
engender only reduced expectations, while “unilateral modification of contractual 
undertakings by government […] deserve clearly more scrutiny”. 68  The key 
element in establishing the legitimacy or, rectius, the legal strength of the 
expectation is the specificity of the undertaking relied upon by the investor. The 
El Paso decision tried to further clarify the point by arguing that a commitment is 
to be considered ‘specific’ when it is directly made to the investor, “for example 
in a contract or in a letter of intent, or even through a specific promise in a person-
to-person business meeting” and “its precise object was to give a real guarantee 
of stability to the investor”.69  
This approach has gradually made its way also into arbitral decisions 
concerning public services. The Total decision represents a good case in point. It 
concerned an investor that had no contractual relationship with the host country, 
because it had invested after the original privatization process by acquiring an 
indirect share in the Argentinian gas transportation company (Transportadora de 
Gas del Norte) from another investor in 2001. To determine whether Argentina’s 
modification of the tariff regime violated Total’s legitimate expectations, the 
arbitral tribunal started by making it clear that signing a BIT cannot be taken as 
indicating States’ will to “relinquish their regulatory powers [or] limit their 
responsibility to amend their legislation”. Therefore, “in the absence of some 
‘promise’ by the host State or a specific provision in the treaty itself, the legal 
regime in force in the host country at the time of making the investment is not 
automatically subject to a “guarantee of stability”. According to the Tribunal, 
expectations are “undoubtedly legitimate” when based upon contracts, 
concessions or stabilization clauses “on which the investor is […] entitled to rely 
as a matter of law”.70 The same holds true for other, albeit less formal, types of 
representations provided that they are sufficiently clear and specific.71 
                                                        
68 Continental Casualty Company (n.46) para. 261. 
69 El Paso (n. 38) paras. 376-377. 
70 Total (n. 62) para. 117. 
71 Ibid., para. 121. 
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However, the Tribunal also acknowledged that problems may arise with 
regard to certain specific sectors, such as “operation of utilities under a licence”, 
where expectations “rooted in regulation of a normative and administrative nature, 
that is not specifically addressed to the relevant investor”, may be legitimate, due 
to the “inherently prospective nature of the regulation at issue aimed at providing 
a defined framework for future operations”.72 In fact, unilateral modifications to 
the guarantees contained therein cannot be considered irrelevant when assessing 
whether the host State acted equitably and fairly. There is only, as duly warned by 
the Total Tribunal, the need for greater caution because these expectations are 
inherently weaker than those originating from more specific undertakings. This 
element is thus to be taken into account when weighing investors’ expectations 
and the host State’s regulatory interest in order to determine whether the 
modification of the regulatory framework constitutes a breach of the FET 
standard. 
  
4.2 The Need to Search for State Purpose    
Early public service cases excluded that the purpose pursued by host States 
when making use of their regulatory powers had any relevance when assessing 
whether the frustration of investors’ expectations amounted to a violation of the 
FET.73 By adopting such an agnostic approach, these arbitral tribunals showed a 
“deplorable lack of sensitivity with regards to regulatory issues”.74 Indeed, they 
focused exclusively on the effects of regulatory changes on investors’ positions, 
while disregarding the reasons why these measures had been adopted. For 
instance, both the Enron and Sempra decisions curtly observed that “[e]ven 
assuming that the Respondent was guided by the best of intentions, which the 
Tribunal has no reason to doubt, there has here been an objective breach of the 
fair and equitable treatment due under the Treaty”.75 
Even a cursory comparative analysis demonstrates that this approach is at 
odds with the line of reasoning traditionally followed in domestic and other 
                                                        
72 Ibid., para. 122. 
73 For an insightful analysis on the need to inquire into State purpose with regard in particular to the 
national treatment standard, see J. Kurtz, ‘Balancing Investor Protection and Regulatory Freedom in 
International Investment Law: The Necessary, Complex and Vital Search for State Purpose’ (2013-14) 
Yearbook of International Investment Law and Policy 280, 280-303 
74 M. Krajewski, ‘The Impact of International Investment Agreements on Energy Regulation’ (2012) 3 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law 343, 366.  
75 Sempra (n. 26) para. 304; Enron (n. 56) para. 268. 
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supranational jurisdictions. Pitting individual expectations against the public 
interest pursued through the measures challenged is a constant feature of the 
CJEU case law on this matter. This is well exemplified by Dieckmann & Hansen, 
a judgment of the then Court of First Instance concerning an importation ban on 
fishery products from Kazakhstan, in view of the systemic deficiencies in the 
general regime of health supervision. A German company, which had concluded a 
contract to import caviar from that country, brought an annulment action against 
this decision, arguing that the act violated its legitimate expectations by not 
including transitional provisions in the decision to remove a country from the list 
of third countries from which the import of fishery products is authorised. The 
Court dismissed this claim, as it held that the choice was then taken to protect 
consumers’ health, which is an overriding public interest within the meaning of 
the case law.76  
The need to pay due consideration to purpose pursued by the host State 
through the modification of the regulatory framework is integral to the choice to 
protect foreign investors’ expectations as part of the FET. Indeed, as seen above, 
this protection is not absolute, but it has to be reconciled with the safeguard of 
States’ ability to regulate. Therefore, modifications of the regulatory framework 
that pursue a public interest are, in principle, neither unfair nor inequitable. In this 
regard, more recent arbitral awards, progressively abandoning the agnostic 
approach seen above and paying due consideration to the State’s regulatory 
purpose, are a step in the right direction. Interestingly, the Total Award motivated 
the adoption of this approach by referring to the fact that “TGN’s gas 
transportation is not an ordinary business operation but it is qualified as a 
‘national public service’”. 77  Consequently, the assessment of whether the 
modification of the regulatory framework constitutes a breach of investor’s 
legitimate expectations. Hence, a violation of the FET standard must take into 
account “the purposes, nature and objectives of the measures challenged, so to 
determine that they are reasonable and proportionate”.78 In the same vein, the 
AWG/Suez Tribunal, ruling on a case concerning “one of the world’s largest water 
distribution and waste water treatment privatizations in a great city” such as 
Buenos Aires, held that in interpreting the FET standard it “must balance the 
                                                        
76 Case T-155/99, Dieckmann & Hansen [2001], ECR II-3143, para. 81. See Craig (n. 56) 639-341. 
77 Total (n. 54) para. 160. 
78 Ibid., para. 162. 
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legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Claimants with Argentina’s right to 
regulate the provision of a vital public service”.79 
 
4.3 Proportionality Analysis and Deference 
Sensitiveness toward host State’s intentions has gone hand in hand with the, 
often tentative, adoption by arbitral tribunals of what can be loosely termed a 
proportionality analysis. The idea that these elements represent two faces of the 
same coin emerges clearly in El Paso, where the Tribunal, after having 
highlighted that legitimate expectations “have to be deduced […] with due regard 
to the rights of the State”, i.e. “[i]n other words, a balance should be established 
between the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor to make a fair return 
on its investment and the right of the host State to regulate its economy in the 
public interest”.80  
Until few years ago, proportionality analysis enjoyed far more success in the 
literature than in the arbitral practice. 81  More recently, a growing number of 
tribunals is turning to this method of review to reconcile investors’ expectations 
and States’ right to adapt the regulatory framework. However, many of these 
references betrays a less-than-systematic approach to this method, as several 
arbitral decisions tended to jump to the preferred conclusion without elaborating 
much on the successive argumentative steps.82 Yet, recourse to this method of 
review is welcome, especially with regard to the reconciliation between stability 
and change under the FET, for a number of reasons. First, it operationalizes the 
idea according to which that the legitimate expectations doctrine and, thus, the 
protection of regulatory stability is not absolute, but it “must give way where [its] 
application becomes incompatible with the free and proper exercise of an 
                                                        
79 AWG/Suez (n. 34) para. 236. See A. Tanzi, ‘Recent Trends in International Investment Arbitration 
and the Protection of Human Rights in the Public Services Sector’, in N. Boschiero, T. Scovazzi, C. 
Pitea and C. Ragni (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law. Essays in Honour of 
Tullio Treves (TMC Asser Press 2013) 592-596. See also A. Tanzi, ‘Public Interest Concerns in 
International Investment Arbitration in the Water Services Sector. Problems and Prospects for an 
Integrated Approach’, in Treves, Seatzu and Trevisanut (eds) (n. 49) 308-324. 
80 El Paso (n. 38) para. 358 (italics added). 
81 On the use of proportionality analysis in investment arbitration there is burgeoning literature; see, 
ex multis, E.M. Lehonardsen, ‘Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 95, 95-136; B. 
Kingsbury, S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with the State Regulatory 
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82 Henckels (n. 47), 107-110 (pointedly criticizing the Tecmed Award for going directly to the third step 
of the proportionality test – balancing – without even taking into consideration the other two). 
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authority’s powers on the due performance of its duties in the public interest”.83 
Secondly, this method of review allows for a comprehensive evaluation of all the 
interests at stake, such as, in this case, protection of foreign investors’ 
expectations and respect for host States’ ability to regulate. 84  Thirdly, it 
potentially offers a clear analytical structure to make arbitrators’ value judgments 
more explicit and transparent. 
For all its merits, arbitral tribunals’ reliance upon the proportionality analysis 
has been severely criticized. Some commentators stressed that this method of 
review give adjudicators too much discretion and an excessive capacity to intrude 
into national decision-makers’ realm. This is highly problematic when 
adjudicators, such as international arbitral panels, are not embedded in any polity 
and not subjects to the institutional limitations that normally apply to courts.85 The 
critique deserve utmost attention, touching upon a key feature of the system. 
However, one cannot assume that it inevitably leads to abandoning the 
proportionality analysis, since this concern can be addressed by adjusting the 
structure of the test and by adopting a deferential standard of review.86 
First, it is worth recalling that the proportionality analysis is conventionally 
described as consisting of three steps: suitability, necessity and balancing (or 
proportionality strictu sensu). Most of the problems lie with the third step, which 
allows adjudicators to determine whether the burden imposed on foreign 
investors’ expectations is justified in the light of the importance of the interest 
pursued by the host State. This entails a value judgment as to the relative weight 
attached by national authorities to the specific interest that motivated their 
regulatory intervention. Due to their nature and institutional features, arbitral 
tribunals are particularly ill suited to carry out this type of scrutiny and, 
consequently, they should focus exclusively on the first two steps. It has been 
argued that abstaining from this type of control “would allow the severe 
restriction of a right in order to protect a negligible public interest”.87 This remark 
is problematic more for its premises than for its content. Indeed, it presupposes 
                                                        
83 W. Wade, C. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2000) 242. 
84 Contra W.W. Burke-White, A. von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Sphere: The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitration’ (2010) 35 The Yale Journal of International Law 283, 287. 
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that arbitral tribunals are entitled to decide whether a public interest is negligible 
or not. Conversely, the present article contends that only national authorities are 
in the position to attach a weight to a public interest, while arbitral tribunals 
cannot substitute for their judgment.88   
Second, arbitral tribunals should adopt a deferential standard of review89 
when evaluating suitability and necessity of host States’ measures. The reasons 
that justify the adoption of a deferential approach in international arbitral 
adjudication have already been thoroughly and convincingly analysed elsewhere90 
and, therefore, there is no need to reconsider them. What is worth highlighting 
here is that the main rationales for deference identified by those scholars – such as 
normative and empirical uncertainty, regulatory autonomy and proximity, as well 
as institutional competence and expertise – are very much relevant in the case of 
public services. As seen above, regulating public services is one of States’ core 
sovereign functions, essential for the wellbeing of their population and for the 
enjoyment of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, the exercise of this 
function is intrinsically linked to democratic autonomy and it involves delicate 
questions of resource allocation that are inherently discretional and that call for an 
intimate knowledge of the socio-political context. For all these reasons, 
international adjudicators are not in the position to adopt too an intrusive 
approach because they must fully respect national decision-makers’ broad 
discretionary space in this field.  
The most troubling aspect in this respect concerns the necessity analysis. It is 
worth observing that, when performing this analysis, the ECHR has consistently 
adopted a deferential approach, on the basis that “national authorities are in 
principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in “the 
public interest”. Therefore, as made clear in James and Others v. UK, “the 
possible existence of alternative solutions does not in itself render the contested 
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legislation unjustified. Provided that the legislature remains within the bounds of 
its margin of appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether the legislation 
represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the 
legislature’s discretion should have been exercised in another way”.91 
Conversely, the analysis of the arbitral practice concerning public services 
reveals the existence of cases where arbitral tribunals have adopted a far more 
intrusive approach. In AWG/Suez, for instance, the Tribunal found that the 
contested measures failed to pass the necessity test, by finding that Argentina 
could have “employed more flexible means” to achieve the same ends. In so 
doing, it identified some alternative measures that Argentina could have taken 
instead of altering the legal framework and the concession. In particular, the 
Tribunal opined that, to protect the most impoverished part of the population from 
increased tariffs and, thus, make sure that it could have access to water services, 
national authorities “might have allowed tariff increases for other consumers 
while applying a social tariff or a subsidy to the poor”.92 The most troubling 
aspect of this part of the decision is the carelessness with which the arbitral 
tribunal applied a test that intrudes deeply into matters lying at the heart of States’ 
regulatory space. Indeed, when called upon to review the necessity of the 
measure, it simply identified a potential alternative to which Argentina could have 
resorted, without paying any attention to its feasibility in light of the constraints 
imposed on the government’s capacity to intervene by a financial crisis of the 
magnitude of the one gripping Argentina at that time. The interpretative approach 
followed by the tribunal makes the necessity test a virtually insurmountable 
obstacle for the State seeking to justify the adopted measure because, if one 
ignores reality, there will always be a hypothetical less restrictive alternative that 
the host State should have adopted. Furthermore, the tribunal failed to consider 
that, in fact, Argentina had actually tried to cope with the crisis by adopting 
measures other than those challenged by the Claimant. Between 2000 and 2001, 
Argentina sought to buttress the peso’s convertibility by obtaining emergency 
financial assistance from the IMF, and despite growing resentment in the 
population, it did not alter the legislative and regulatory framework of the utility 
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sectors. It was only in 2002, with the adoption of the Emergency Law, that 
Argentine authorities decided to modify public services’ regulatory framework.  
Other arbitral decisions concerning the same factual scenario have adopted a 
more cautious approach. In LG&E, the Tribunal rejected the claim that 
Argentina’s emergency measures were not necessary and, hence, disproportionate 
for not being “the only means available to respond to the crisis”. Indeed, although 
admitting that the Government had other available options, the Tribunal held that 
“suspension of the calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and the PPI adjustment of 
tariffs was a legitimate way of protecting its social and economic system”.93 
Likewise, Arbitrator Nikken called for the adoption of a similarly deferential 
approach in his dissenting opinion in AWG/Suez. In particular, he argued that, 
when assessing the necessity of the measures, tribunals should just assess 
“whether the various measures taken by Argentina were such that any reasonably 
good government of a well-organized modern State could have adopted” and not 
“substitute itself for the Argentine Government when it had to address the serious 
crisis that hit the country”.94  
 
5. Conclusion 
In the public services’ sector, regulation is the main tool for public authorities 
to pursue fundamental social objectives by ensuring access to high-quality 
services. Indeed, over the past decades many States have privatized or liberalized 
the provision of public services by progressively transferring to private actors 
some of the functions traditionally performed by public entities. However, the 
choice of moving along this path does not deprive States of their right to regulate 
the organization and the supply of public services; nor does it absolve them from 
their duty to guarantee the continuous realization of the rights that depend on the 
provision of these services. 
In exercising these functions, States resort to a variety of regulatory tools, 
which are often contained in different legal instruments, such as constitutional 
norms, legislative acts, administrative regulations and contractual agreements 
stipulated with the private provider. Foreign operators investing in this sector may 
challenge before an international arbitral tribunal any modification of the 
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regulatory framework if it violates rules or standards contained in an international 
investment agreement. 
The impact of international investment law on States’ capacity to modify the 
regulatory framework governing public services depends on the definition 
treaties’ provisions and, in particular, on the willingness of arbitral tribunals to 
pay due regard to the specific social value of these activities. Early arbitral 
decisions tended to consider regulatory stability as an absolute priority by 
showing a deplorable lack of sensitivity to any competing objective. 
This was the case with regard to the FET standard, as arbitral tribunals sought 
to progressively expand its scope in order to strengthen the position of foreign 
investors. In particular, they took the view that one of the FET’s main components 
is host State’s duty to ensure the stability of the investment’s regulatory 
framework, by avoiding any modification that may frustrate investors’ legitimate 
expectations. If taken too rigidly, this duty may fetter host States’ capacity to 
adapt the legislative environment to ever-changing needs and challenges. Despite 
acknowledging the need to guarantee an adequate regulatory space to national 
authorities, especially in a sector such as public services, some early decisions 
adopted an over-broad reading of the duty to protect investors’ expectations, 
paying little attention to States’ regulatory purposes. 
More recent decisions have shown a slightly greater sensitivity to these 
concerns, trying to accommodate host States’ right to regulate and investors’ 
expectations. In some cases, arbitral tribunals have motivated the shift toward a 
more balanced approach by referring to the fact that the activity was not an 
ordinary commercial one, but a public service. This article sought to systematize 
these efforts, proposing an interpretive approach that combines three different 
aspects so to contribute to the reconciliation of stability and change in this 
context.  
First, arbitral tribunals have to recognize that not any expectation that the 
investor had when it decided to invest can be protected, because only ‘legitimate’ 
ones fall within FET’s scope of application. Some arbitral awards have already 
moved along this path, making it clear that expectations can be taken into 
consideration only if grounded on a specific commitment given by the host State 
to the investor.  
Second, arbitral tribunals need to search for host State’s regulatory purpose 
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when assessing whether a modification of the regulatory framework does 
represent a violation of investors’ legitimate expectations. More recent arbitral 
awards have progressively abandoned the lack of sensitivity shown by earlier 
decision toward this aspect. This is a welcome evolution that builds on the idea 
that the protection of investors’ expectations is not absolute, as it can be accorded 
only in so far it does not unduly encroach upon host States’ capacity to respond to 
pressing social needs.    
Third, increased sensitiveness toward this issue should come together with the 
adoption by arbitral tribunals of a proportionality analysis. This method allows for 
the reconciliation of all the interests at stake, operationalizing the idea that the 
protection of regulatory stability need to be reconciled with other competing 
objectives. Due to their institutional features and their remoteness form the 
relevant polity, international arbitral tribunals should limit their scrutiny to the 
first two steps of the proportionality test and adopt a deferential standard of 
review. This exercise of judicial restraint does not deprive international arbitrators 
of their capacity to assess whether the modification of the regulatory framework 
was unjust or unfair, while, at same time, avoiding to unduly encroaching upon 
host States’ ability to meet new needs and challenges. This is all the more urgent 
when the regulation of public services is at stake, being it a core sovereign 
function that is essential for the well-being of the population and that touches 
upon key aspects of States’ democratic autonomy and legitimacy. In this context, 
regulatory stability cannot not be ensured at any cost. 
 
  
